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If Amplifon completes its proposed acquisition of GN Hearing, the deal could reshape parts of the U.S. hearing aid market by bringing together two long-time rivals—Miracle-Ear and Beltone—under one corporate roof while giving the world’s largest hearing aid retailer its own major manufacturing arm.
The proposed €2.3 billion (US$2.64 billion) acquisition would transform Amplifon from the world’s largest hearing aid retailer into a vertically integrated company with its own major manufacturing division. GN, by contrast, would exit hearing healthcare and refocus on audio, video, and gaming. In effect, it would shift from being a diversified technology group carrying substantial debt after its SteelSeries acquisition to a smaller, more cyclical audio-and-gaming company with cash to deploy and a sizable equity stake in Amplifon.
GN says the hearing business being sold includes ReSound, Beltone, Jabra Enhance, Interton, and Danavox/Danalogic, along with related hearing intellectual property, R&D, manufacturing, operations, and Beltone network partnerships. Left behind in the acquisition is GN’s position in NationsHearing, which GN would presumably sell off sometime after the deal is finalized. Amplifon—which already includes the large Amplifon and Miracle-Ear retail networks, the Amplifon Hearing Health Care benefits division, and major branded chains like GAES and Beter Horen in other countries—says the combined business would generate roughly €3.3 billion (about US$3.8 billion) in revenue and create a new “integrated leader” in audiology.
The announcement of the deal took most hearing industry veterans by surprise. While many believe the industry is still due for further consolidation, the big surprise is that it was Amplifon that bought GN Hearing. Demant, the world’s second-largest hearing-aid company and owner of Oticon, was always considered the most likely suitor, with similar corporate cultures and headquarters about four miles apart near Copenhagen. Demant also owns about 12% of GN shares, but according to a recent MedWatch article, it is likely not in a legal position to block the deal.
As DNB Carnegie’s Niels Granholm-Leth, a veteran market analyst based in Copenhagen told HearingTracker, “Forward integration [a manufacturer buying a distributor] mostly happens in tiny steps, and most people never hear about them. This backward integration step will reshape the global hearing care industry.”
Brandon Sawalich, President and CEO of Starkey—the only US-headquartered global manufacturer—offered a somewhat more subdued assessment. While he said the transaction should prove significant over time, he told HearingTracker he does not yet see it as an immediate market-altering event in North America. In his view, the outcome will depend less on the announcement itself than on whether Amplifon can successfully integrate a technology manufacturer into a retailer-led organization with a very different operating culture.
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Although it may be more diplomatic to describe the relationship between Beltone and Miracle-Ear owners as one of grudging respect, the two networks have long been fierce competitors, dating back to the 1940s, when they were founded by the Posen family in Chicago and the mercurial Kenneth Dahlberg in Minneapolis, respectively. Each company built a strong U.S. identity around local offices, recognizable branding, and tightly managed product ecosystems.
Today, Miracle-Ear has roughly 1,600 U.S. locations, while Beltone has about 1,200-1,350. That would place close to 3,000 U.S. points of sale under one corporate umbrella, even before counting Amplifon’s broader hearing-benefits in managed care. The two networks differ in their ownership structure: public filings indicate Miracle-Ear operates roughly 400 company-owned U.S. offices alongside about 1,200 franchised locations, while Beltone appears to remain an almost completely independent franchisee-owner network.
Michael Andreozzi, former owner of the nation’s largest Beltone network and current president of the International Hearing Society (IHS), believes Beltone’s future under Amplifon will depend on preserving the independent, community-based strengths that have long defined the brand. “From a Beltone perspective, the dealer network has always been a very strong model because it combines local ownership with world-class technology and product innovation,” Andreozzi told HearingTracker. “Having spent many years earlier in my career as a Miracle-Ear franchise owner, I’ve seen firsthand how powerful the combination of brand marketing, advanced hearing solutions, and strong local relationships can be for patients and communities. Beltone providers bring that same level of innovation and care into their markets every day. Going forward, the opportunity will be making sure that model continues to thrive alongside Amplifon’s corporate retail presence—leveraging the strength of the products while maintaining the personalized care and clinical expertise that independent Beltone offices are known for.”
Similarly, Sawalich said the announcement itself is only the beginning. “The press release is the easy part,” he said, comparing it to announcing the schedule for a game that has not yet been played. The harder part, he says, will be what comes next: integrating culture, business systems, leadership, and talent across two very different organizations.
Based on estimates shared by Granholm-Leth, Miracle-Ear’s 1,600 stores and Beltone’s 1,350 stores may account for about 650,000 units—implying a combined market share of roughly 12% of the U.S. prescription hearing aid market, or around 14% when the VA is excluded. Sawalich also ventured an estimate of “about 15%.” Although these figures are slightly lower than HearingTracker’s estimates, they still put the combined Amplifon-Beltone enterprise within shouting distance of the nation’s two largest hearing aid distributors, the VA (≈19%) and Costco (≈16%).
Taken together, these figures and comments from industry experts suggest that Miracle-Ear and Beltone generate relatively modest unit volume per office. That means the real strategic value of the deal may lie as much in controlling supply and capturing more of the hearing care value chain as in gaining raw market share.
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That logic aligns with Amplifon’s own story. The company aims for €60-80 million (US$69-92 million) in annual synergies by the end of 2029, mainly driven by “insourcing” hearing aid volumes it currently purchases from external suppliers. While expanding the retail presence is the primary goal, it’s also about gaining more control over the economics from the factory floor to the fitting room.
Currently, it’s still too early to say how the deal will affect the U.S. hearing aid market. Miracle-Ear’s current major suppliers—primarily Sonova, Demant, and Starkey—could face some headwinds over time as Amplifon shifts more volume toward GN-built products. Bernstein’s Susannah Ludwig and colleagues suggest this could gradually affect 2-4% of Sonova's and Demant’s sales (Starkey is a privately held company, so sales figures are not available, but Sawalich acknowledged they were not insubstantial).
Amplifon says it intends to preserve GN Hearing’s identity, brands, and core capabilities within the combined organization (see below or download our map for more details). And that makes eminent sense. There is potential for wholesale backlash. Some independent hearing care providers have already complained publicly on LinkedIn that GN may no longer be viewed as one of the few large global manufacturers committed to supplying high-quality products and services to mostly independent practices. If that sentiment spreads, GN could lose some goodwill among independent providers who are uneasy about what the merger could mean for future innovation and support, opening the door for rival manufacturers.
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But any changes are unlikely to be immediate. Granholm-Leth believes Amplifon will probably want to keep the Miracle-Ear and Beltone networks separate for many years. For this reason, they may just continue using third-party suppliers in Miracle-Ear for strategic reasons: it could help maintain brand differentiation while avoiding a sudden disruption in software, workflows, and product mix.
Indeed, one of the most interesting questions raised by the transaction is whether Amplifon can truly keep the two banners distinct. Miracle-Ear is a hybrid system with both corporate-owned and franchised stores, while Beltone remains more decentralized with its independent-ownership structure. But both networks (and, some might argue, much of the hearing care industry) have an aging population of owners, primarily hearing aid specialists. Amplifon has reportedly been trying to buy more Miracle-Ear stores and may want more direct control of the network, but doing the same with Beltone would require even more capital—which may not be welcomed by investors if it means spending heavily to acquire stores the company already effectively influences through supply and branding relationships.
In Sawalich’s view, Amplifon will have to “thread the needle” if it wants to continue its expansion, maintain brand differentiation, preserve relationships, and build manufacturing credibility at the same time.
Granholm-Leth and I both believe the Amplifon-GN deal could raise barriers to entry for outside players in the industry. In particular, the growing technological sophistication and availability of hearing aids from China and other Pacific Rim countries are impressive (see my report from CES 2026). For example, Elehear and Yeasound offer what HearingTracker deems some of the best OTC hearing aids, and ORKA announced last week a Bose-powered RIC hearing aid with active noise cancellation. While most are currently limited to OTC, it seems likely that United Imaging, NewSound, or another major Chinese player could eventually target the U.S. prescriptive hearing aid market.
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However, as the largest global hearing aid companies become more integrated, it becomes harder for new manufacturers to break into Western markets. Instead of selling through large independent and retail channels, they may increasingly be relegated to online OTC sales, pharmacies, or big-box stores, which are less attractive, more difficult to scale, and more price-sensitive in a highly competitive field (see the recent HearingTracker pricing survey and analysis by Abram Bailey, AuD).
Another under-discussed issue is branding. Because GN is retaining its broader Jabra headset and enterprise-audio businesses, the Jabra hearing brand may need to be licensed, restructured, or eventually rebranded. Granholm-Leth believes GN could allow the hearing business to continue using Jabra branding in certain channels under a royalty fee, at least for a time. That would soften the transition, especially in OTC and at Costco, where Jabra Enhance Select (branded as Lively only 4 years ago) and Jabra Enhance Pro already have established recognition, respectively.
And history offers another cautionary tale. During Phonak’s failed attempt to acquire GN ReSound in 2006-2007, GN reduced its investment in research and product development while the deal was in limbo. For a company long known for groundbreaking “firsts” in hearing aid technology, that pause proved costly: when German regulators blocked the transaction in 2007, ReSound had lost momentum and found itself playing catch-up for the next several years—a position it was not accustomed to. Something similar could happen again if the current Amplifon transaction becomes drawn out, although the antitrust issues are significantly different this time. Again, the greater risk may lie in execution: resource distractions, talent flight, integration fatigue, and delayed product cycles.
When I asked Granholm-Leth to act as a Vegas bookmaker on the deal, he now estimates the odds of an acquisition at about 80%, with a lower chance of a more complicated Demant-related alternative. Although still possible, the most likely outcome seems to be not a bidding war but a reshaping of the hearing aid market by a powerful combination of retail scale, patient access, and manufacturing control.
However, at least in the near term, the Amplifon-GN deal may have greater implications for the global hearing aid market. As Sawalich succinctly put it: “As I think about the U.S. market, I don’t see this changing a lot immediately. Ultimately, it’s all going to depend on the end product of what this new company becomes. It’s going to require great leadership and a clear vision to set that course, and they’re going to have to thread the needle on this one.”
Karl Strom ist der Chefredakteur von HearingTracker. Er war Gründungsredakteur von The Hearing Review und berichtet seit über 30 Jahren über die Hörhilfenindustrie.
